An insurance provider (e.g., an insurance company) may have a stake in the driving behaviors of the operators of private vehicles who are insured under its plans. For example, the insurance provider may determine insurance rates based on an analysis of collisions, traffic accidents, and/or tickets that the operators of private vehicles that are insured under its plans may receive. The insurance provider may rely on self-reporting from the operators themselves and/or government agencies (e.g., police departments, departments of motor vehicles, municipalities) to collect this information. However, the collected information may be misleading and/or incomplete. For example, the newly insured drivers (e.g., those that just passed a driving test and were recently insured) may not have a driving history on which to assess rates. Therefore, the insurance provider may not properly allocate insurance rates between operators having a common demographic profile but very different driving behaviors.
In addition, the insurance provider may wish to encourage desired behaviors of the operators of private vehicles. Punitive based methods of controlling the behavior of the operators of private vehicles may fail to facilitate adoption of desired behaviors. A lack of ability to properly monitor and/or incentivize the behavior of the operators of private vehicles may prevent insurance providers from improving and/or gaining useful knowledge of the behavior of operators of private vehicles. This may result in a lack of transparency in the insurance rate pricing system, and increased fees for the operators who otherwise deserve lower rates.